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Abstract
Background: We aimed to synthesize the evidence of a causal effect and draw inferences about whether Canadian
primary care reforms improved health system performance based on measures of health service utilization,
processes of care, and physician productivity.
Methods: We searched the Embase, PubMed and Web of Science databases for records from 2000 to September
2015. We based our risk of bias assessment on the Grading of Recommendations Assessment, Development and
Evaluation guidelines. Full-text studies were synthesized and organized according to the three outcome categories:
health service utilization, processes of care, and physician costs and productivity.
Results: We found moderate quality evidence that team-based models of care led to reductions in emergency
department use, but the evidence was mixed for hospital admissions. We also found low quality evidence that
team-based models, blended capitation models and pay-for-performance incentives led to small and sometimes
non-significant improvements in processes of care. Studies examining new payment models on physician costs and
productivity were of high methodological quality and provided a coherent body of evidence assessing enhanced
fee-for-service and blended capitation payment models.
Conclusion: A small number of studies suggested that team-based models contributed to reductions in
emergency department use in Quebec and Alberta. Regarding processes of diabetes care, studies found higher
rates of testing for blood glucose levels, retinopathy and cholesterol in Alberta’s team-based primary care model
and in practices eligible for pay-for-performance incentives in Ontario. However pay-for-performance in Ontario was
found to have null to moderate effects on other prevention and screening activities. Although blended capitation
payment in Ontario contributed to decreases in the number of services delivered and patients seen per day, the
number of enrolled patients and number of days worked in a year was similar to that of enhanced fee-for-service
practices.
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Background
Between 2000 and 2006 the Primary Health Care Transi-
tion Fund (PHCTF) contributed $800 million towards
reforming primary care in Canadian provinces and terri-
tories. This effort was aimed to address the health service
needs of the country’s ageing population and growing
burden of chronic disease [1]. Common objectives were in
keeping with the idea of the patient-centered medical
home (PCMH): increase access to primary care, promote
multidisciplinary team-based care, and improve chronic
disease management [2].
The reform initiatives implemented across Canadian
jurisdictions have largely emphasized quality improvement
and incentive-base levers, and/or organizational changes
to practice, including the formation of primary care teams,
partnerships, networks, or federations of physicians [3].
In addition, there is growing recognition that the mechan-
ism of physician remuneration plays a role in upholding
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primary health care objectives such as continuity and
quality of care [4, 5]. Organizational change to primary
care practice in Canada is understood to encompass both
team-based service delivery involving allied health profes-
sionals, and new blended payment models that seek to
promote patient enrolment, continuity, and coordination
of care.
Syntheses of primary care reforms in Canada have called
for rigorous evaluation of reforms using appropriate
health system performance indicators [1, 3]. Although a
number of studies on various aspects of provincial reforms
have been published, no systematic review of the literature
exists on the effects produced from practice-level
organizational changes [6]. Given that models are evolving
and new ones are being proposed, it is imperative to
synthesize the knowledge accumulated on these reforms
to support future policies. We sought to systematically
review and assess the published and peer-reviewed litera-
ture that describes practice-level organizational reforms in
Canada introduced during or after the PHCTF. We specif-
ically aimed to synthesize the evidence of effects and draw
inferences about whether Canadian primary care reforms
improved health system performance based on measures
of health service utilization, processes of care, and phys-
ician productivity.
Methods
Data sources and inclusion criteria
Our review focused on organizational reforms to primary
care in Canada, namely, the formation of group practices
(including team-based practices), new payment models
intended to support group practice, or both. Provinces
that introduced quality and incentive-based reforms with-
out an emphasis on providing financial support for group
or team-based practices were not included in this review.
Further, those that did implement organizational reforms
to practice but only did so in pilot projects were also
excluded. We limited the scope of our review to Alberta,
Ontario and Quebec where system-wide reform initiatives
that meet the above criteria have been pursued [3].
In Alberta and Quebec, the team element of including
nurses and other health professionals in primary care
practice was an integral feature of the Primary Care
Network (PCN) and Family Medicine Group (FMG) re-
forms. For this reason, we refer to these practice models
as ‘teams’ throughout the text and in the results tables.
However, we refer to the more general term of ‘group
practice’ in Ontario to underscore the fact that payment
reforms were the main changes that were followed by
the creation of Family Health Teams that operate
within specific new payment models. To elaborate, only
physicians that accept a blended capitation payment
and are members of Family Health Organizations
(FHO) or Family Health Networks (FHN) can become a
Family Health Team (FHT). As such, while a group of
physicians may practice in the same FHO or FHN, they
are not necessarily an FHT. In instances where FHTs
are no specifically referenced, we used the term ‘group
practice’ when discussing reforms in Ontario.
We searched the Embase, PubMed and Web of Science
databases for records from 2000 to September 2015.
We used both general search terms that referred to pri-
mary care reform in Canada and search terms specific
to the provinces of interest (Appendix A). Studies were
eligible if they sought to draw inferences on the effects
of new organizational or payment models in the Canadian
provinces of interest. Search terms were modified accord-
ing to the database, where appropriate. We also conducted
a hand-search of references cited in the studies included
in the review.
Study selection
Two reviewers (RC and BDR) independently screened
titles and abstracts of records identified from the data-
base search and included those based on the following
criteria: (1) the study pertained to Canada; (2) the study
examined reforms in Alberta, Quebec, or Ontario; and
(3) the study reported quantitative measures of effect.
Studies were excluded if the intervention could not be
classified under the defined categories, if the outcome
did not fall into the categories outlined in Table 1, or if
the study was a commentary. The same two reviewers
further investigated studies eligible for inclusion as full
text.
We synthesized and organized the results of the full-
text studies included in the review according to the
three outcome categories: health service utilization,
processes of care, and physician costs and productivity.
We reported estimates of adjusted measures of effect
and precision. We did not summarize results from
studies that did not provide adjusted measures of asso-
ciation. Our descriptive synthesis also excluded cross-
sectional studies. Although cross-sectional studies can
be used to detect associations between factors, they
cannot provide evidence for the effect of interventions
because temporality cannot be established. Considerable
heterogeneity between studies with regard to interventions
and measures of outcome precluded a meta-analysis. Our
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review follows the Preferred Reporting Items for System-
atic Reviews and Meta-Analyses (PRISMA) statement [7].
Data extraction and quality assessment
Two reviewers (RC and BDR) independently extracted
data and performed a risk of bias assessment for each
full-text study included in the review. We first piloted
our extraction and quality assessment forms on four
studies to standardize our approach. We based our risk of
bias assessment on GRADE guidelines [8] with adaptations
to account for issues of selection bias and exposure def-
initions specific to our context. Although randomized
controlled trials are considered the gold standard for
evaluating interventions, it is widely acknowledged that
this study design is not feasible for evaluating certain
exposures. Other study designs, such as before and
after studies with a control group and interrupted time
series analyses, are recognized as having the potential to
contribute high quality evidence [9]. Studies that exploited
a natural experiment setting by including cohorts of physi-
cians or patients before and after the introduction of a re-
form and also incorporated a control group were granted
a higher rating. There were two main reasons for this: (1)
accounting for pre-intervention trends controls for ob-
served and unobserved time fixed confounding factors,
and (2) the addition of the control group addresses secular
trends in the outcome (i.e. factors association with
changes in the outcome that vary over time), assuming
the control group serves as an appropriate counterfactual
for what would have occurred to those that experienced
the intervention if they had not been exposed to it.
Since physician and patient participation in new primary
care models is voluntary, studies that addressed the under-
lying mechanisms determining individual membership in
the intervention or control groups either by design or
analytical approach were rated favorably. By comparison,
a study that did not provide a clear definition of the inter-
vention or control groups received a lower rating due to a
greater risk of bias. The body of evidence for each
outcome was then summarized according to GRADE
categories of high, medium, or low (Appendix B) [10]. We
held reconciliation meetings to compare the information
extracted from each study and each reviewer’s evaluation
of study quality. A third party arbitrator (AQV) was avail-
able in the event that disagreements between the two
reviewers could not be resolved (a situation that did not
arise).
Results
Search results and study characteristics
Our search identified 572 studies, 558 of which were from
the databases and 14 from a hand search. After removing
the duplicate records, we screened 326 studies and
excluded 292 based on the reasons listed in Fig. 1. In a
full-text review, we then assessed the 34 remaining studies
for eligibility and excluded 20 for reasons also cited in
Fig. 1. Data extraction and a risk of bias assessment were
performed for the 14 studies included in the systematic
review. Of the 14 studies included, the majority focused
on the effects of new payment models in Ontario [11–19]
(Table 2). The remaining 5 studies from Quebec and
Alberta focused on the effects of team-based aspects of
primary care reforms. [20–24] The publication dates
spanned from 2009 to 2015. In 8 of the studies, specific
sub-populations were studied all of which were comprised
of individuals with chronic disease. These included 4
studies on patients with diabetes [13–15, 20], and 4 on
chronic conditions in general [17, 21, 23, 24]. With regard
to primary outcomes of interest, 3 studies focused on
health service utilization [20–22], 6 on processes of care
[11–15, 23, 24], and 4 on physician costs and productivity
[16–19] (Table 2). Of the 14 studies, 2 assessed independ-
ent associations between several predictors (including
primary care reform models) and health system perform-
ance outcomes, and 12 specifically assessed the causal
effect of defined interventions compared to a control
group.
Effectiveness of interventions
Health service utilization (Table 3)
Three studies examined health service utilization as a
primary outcome focusing on team-based aspects of re-
forms among chronically ill or elderly patients in Quebec
[21] and Alberta [20, 22]. Although the observed tendency
pointed to statistically significant decreases in ED visits,
the evidence on admissions was mixed. Héroux et al. [21]
found a decrease in the rate of visits to the ED attributed
to Family Medicine Group (FMG) enrolment within a vul-
nerable group of patients defined by chronic disease or
older age (RR 0.93; 95 % CI 0.90, 0.95), yet null effects on
hospital admissions (RR 1.02; 95 % CI 0.98, 1.06). In stud-
ies of the effects of Primary Care Networks (PCNs),
Manns et al. [20] reported an 18 % reduction in the rate of
avoidable ED visits made by patients with diabetes affil-
iated with PCNs relative to those in non-PCNs (RR
0.82; 95 % CI 0.76, 0.88) and a 19 % reduction in the
rate of avoidable admissions for the same patient group
(RR 0.81; 95 % CI 0.75, 0.87). Campbell et al. [22] also
found significant reductions in the rate of avoidable use
of the ED and admissions within the general population
(RR 0.75 95 % CI 0.67, 0.85), low-income population
(RR 0.71; 95 % CI 0.54, 0.94), and First Nations (RR
0.74; 95 % CI 0.59, 0.93).
Processes of care (Tables 4 and 5)
Three studies examined measures related to the process
of care for patients with diabetes. These consisted of
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studies examining payment reforms in Ontario:1 pre/post
study with a control group [13], 1 pre/post study with no
control group [15], and 1 cohort study [14]. There was 1
cohort study on team-based practices in Alberta where
processes of diabetes care were secondary outcome mea-
sures [20, 22]. Manns et al. [20] found that relative to pa-
tients with diabetes not enrolled in a PCN, the rate of
patients receiving blood glucose monitoring was 2 %
higher than non-enrolled patients (RR 1.02; 95 % CI 1.01,
1.03). For the same comparison, the rate of visits to the
ophthalmologist was 19 % higher (RR 1.19; 95 % CI 1.17,
1.21). The authors also found that relative to non-PCN
patients, the rate of cholesterol measurement was 3 times
greater (RR 1.03; 95 % CI 1.02, 1.04). Both pre/post studies
assessed the effect of payment reforms in Ontario on dia-
betes processes of care. Jaakimainen et al. [15] estimated
15 % and 14 % decreases in the proportion of patients
with diabetes receiving an annual eye exam after enrolling
with physicians receiving blended capitation and en-
hanced FFS payments, respectively. Kiran et al. [14]
found greater adherence to recommended testing for
diabetes patients in the years following the introduction
of an incentive fee code (RR 1.22; 95 % CI 1.21, 1.23)
however the increases in trend were already occurring
prior to introducing the incentive. Using a difference-
in-differences analysis, Kantarevic et al. [13] studied
physician participation in the Diabetes Management
Initiative, another P4P scheme designed to incentivize
adherence to guidelines. They found that patients with
diabetes receiving recommended tests in Family Health
Organizations (FHO) were 8 % more likely to receive rec-
ommended tests relative to those in the Family Health
Group (FHG) enhanced FFS model.
All four studies examining various outcomes related
to screening and prevention activities in new payment
models used pre/post study designs [11, 12, 15, 18].
Two of these studies included a control group using a
difference-in-differences analysis [12, 18]. Kralj et al.
[18] examined the effect of blended capitation payment
on the delivery of the cancer screening and preventive
care targets (senior flu shots, Pap smears, mammograms,
immunizations and colorectal cancer screening). Their
Fig. 1 PRISMA flow diagram
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Table 2 Characteristics of studies included in the systematic review (Continued)
Kralj, B. et al. 2013 Before
and after
Ontario Physicians 4,156 NA 4 years Blended
capitation






Ontario Physicians 7,003 NA 17 years Enhanced FFSe FFS Physician costs/
productivity
aWhere the name of the practice model was not specified, only the payment modality is listed. Accordingly: Harmonized (blended capitation) models include: Family Health Networks and Family Health Organizations,
Non-harmonized (enhanced FFS) models include: Family Health Group and Chronic Care Model
bThe control group was identified according to how the comparisons were being made in the article and by what was listed as the reference category in a results table from a regression model
cThe intervention group was identified as ‘payment models’ in instances where studies from Ontario survey all payment models as opposed to studying the effect of a single payment model in relation to a control
group. Where the name of the practice model is given, we also specified the payment modality associated with it
dThe authors examined the Family Health Group model (enhanced FFS) and the Family Health Network model (blended capitation). Enhanced FFS refers to predominantly FFS payment with bonuses for extended
opening hours and patient enrolment















findings showed that compared to physicians in the FHG
model who were paid by enhanced FFS, those in the
blended capitation FHO model were 7 to 11 % more
likely to meet preventive care quality targets. Two stud-
ies [11, 12] examined the effect of a P4P incentive on
the delivery of the same cancer screening and prevent-
ive care targets with results indicating null to moderate
effects. Li et al. [12] measured the effect of P4P in new
patient enrolment models. Relative to physicians in
traditional FFS practices, results indicated statistically
significant increases of 2.8, 4.1, 1.8 and 8.5 percentage
points in the delivery of senior flu shots, Pap smears,
mammograms and colorectal cancer screening, respect-
ively. Using an interrupted time-series design, Kiran et al.
[11] found a statistically significant increase of 4.7 % in
the rate of colorectal cancer screening after the introduc-
tion of the P4P incentive. However, the results showed no
statistically significant changes in the rates of breast and
cervical cancer screening. Finally, Jaakimainen et al. [15]
reported overall changes of less than 5 % in the proportion
of women screened for cervical and breast cancer after
joining an FHG or FHN. However, changes of over 5 %
were reported for the proportion of individuals receiving
any type of colorectal cancer screening.
Two studies from Quebec examined outcomes related
to patient-reported health and chronic illness care in
FMGs [23, 24]. In comparison to patients treated in
community health centers, Levesque et al. reported a
small but non-significant effect of FMGs on patient
assessment of chronic illness care. Using the same
comparison group, Feldman et al. found no significant
effects of FMGs on improving patients’ physical health,
mental health or health related quality of life.
Physician costs and productivity (Table 6)
All 4 studies analyzed the data using a difference-in-
differences approach and propensity score matched
physicians at baseline [16–19]. Kantarevic et al. [16]
studied the differences in the number of patient visits
and services delivered by physicians per day. Relative to
enhanced FFS models, physicians paid by blended capi-
tation experienced between 3.8 % and 4.2 % reduction
in the number patient visits per day, and between 5 % and
6 % reduction in the number of services delivered per day.
Kralj et al. found similar reductions of 6 % for the number
of visits per day and 7 % for the number of services deliv-
ered per day [18]. In an earlier study, Kantarevic et al. [19]
examined similar outcomes comparing physicians in
enhanced FFS models with those in traditional FFS
models. Relative to physicians in traditional FFS practices,
those paid by enhanced FFS increased the number of
patient visits by 6.3 % and the number of services by
9.3 %. Kantarevic et al. [17] also addressed the question of
cost-shifting and risk selection in blended capitation
models following the introduction of a new incentive pay-
ment to enroll complex and vulnerable patients. The
results revealed no statistically significant changes in
physician behavior relative to those practicing in
Table 3 Results for health service utilization outcome
Table 4 Results for processes of care outcome (diabetes)
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traditional FFS models that were not eligible for the incen-
tive payment. Kralj et al. [18] also found non-significant
results regarding risk selection when comparing physi-
cians in blended capitation practices with those in en-
hanced FFS practices.
Quality of evidence assessment
GRADE guidelines identify 4 main components for asses-
sing the quality of the body of evidence: study design, risk
of bias, inconsistency and indirectness of results [25]. All
of the studies included in the review were observational.
The risk of bias varied by outcome categories (Table 7),
primarily due to whether the methodology accounted for
selection bias and whether clear definitions of intervention
and control groups were provided. Several studies relied
on administrative population-based data allowing for
increased statistical power to detect effects. In 7 studies,
large longitudinal databases facilitated the use of propen-
sity scores to create matched samples of patients or
physicians at baseline prior to the introduction of an inter-
vention. This approach aimed to address the selection of
physicians and patients into new primary care models.
Variations within team-based or payment-based re-
form initiatives across Canadian jurisdictions and across
included studies resulted in indirect comparisons, which
decreased the overall quality. Despite this, studies on team-
based reforms from Alberta and Quebec provided consist-
ent evidence of reductions in emergency department use,
which resulted in a moderate quality rating. For processes
of care, risk of serious bias and evidence of indirectness in
outcome measures and interventions led to low quality evi-
dence. The methodologies and analytical approaches used
in studies examining physician productivity outcome
measures presented no risk of serious bias and no serious
indirectness or inconsistencies in their comparisons. We
therefore judged the overall quality of the evidence as high
for this outcome.
Discussion
Our review provides the first systematic evidence synthe-
sis of the literature on the effects of recent organizational
changes to primary care in Canada on health system per-
formance outcomes. We found moderate quality evidence
that interdisciplinary team-based models of care such
as Quebec’s FMGs and Alberta’s PCNs led to reduc-
tions in emergency department use, but the evidence
was mixed for hospital admissions. We also found low
quality evidence that team-based models, blended capi-
tation models and pay-for-performance incentives led
to small and sometimes non-significant improvements
in processes of care as measured by the delivery of
screening and prevention services and chronic disease
management. Studies examining the effects of new pay-
ment models in Ontario on physician costs and productiv-
ity were of high methodological quality and provided a
Table 5 Results for processes of care outcome (screening, prevention services and patient perception of care)
Table 6 Results from physician costs and productivity outcome
Carter et al. BMC Health Services Research  (2016) 16:324 Page 8 of 11
coherent body of evidence assessing enhanced FFS and
blended capitation payment models. Findings indicated
that moving from enhanced FFS to blended capitation re-
duced the number of patients seen per day yet the number
of enrolled patients and days worked per year remained
the same.
Our findings on new payment models in Ontario
align with economic theory that FFS incentivizes in-
creasing the volume of services while blended capita-
tion tends to produce reductions. A blended capitation
model may be more efficient than FFS if quality of care
is maintained or elevated and the delivery of inappro-
priate services is reduced [26]. Also, similar to findings
from other systematic reviews, we found that pay-for-
performance incentives yielded some benefits but the
evidence was inconsistent across outcomes, suggesting
that these types of interventions must be carefully de-
signed and executed. This is particularly relevant to the
case of Ontario in which blended payment models
make up the core of the primary care reforms and
where P4P became available to physicians paid through
blended capitation. In the discussion of their findings
on P4P for diabetes management, Kantarevic et al. [13]
make reference to both the incentive amount and the
level of cost-sharing borne by physicians (i.e. after receiv-
ing a fixed payment, the level of reimbursement received
by physicians for delivering incremental services, whether
these be outside of a defined basket services or when
the cost of treating a patient exceeds the fixed payment
amount) as important factors to consider when asses-
sing the effectiveness of P4P incentives in striking a
balance between the quality and quantity of services
delivered to patients. Accordingly, the inconclusive evi-
dence regarding physician responses to P4P incentives
are likely due to differences study methodologies and/
or compensation schemes. For this reason, incentive
payments should be designed with the overarching pay-
ment model in mind [13].
Our review also indicated discrepancies in findings
across studies that may be attributable to jurisdictional
differences in implementation. Notably, findings from
evaluations of Quebec’s FMGs are less convincing than
those from evaluations of Alberta’s PCNs, although both
are team-based primary care models adapted from the
PCMH. In fact, a systematic review on the effects of the
PCMH in the US highlighted that despite shared objec-
tives of better coordination of care, increased access to
and continuity of services, definitional frameworks and
implementation approaches varied widely [27]. And
indeed, a 2015 report from Quebec’s Auditor General
highlighted the lack of a governmental framework for
their implementation and evaluation, which may provide
some insight into why FMGs are not performing as well
as expected [28].
Our review also revealed gaps in the Canadian
evidence of effects of primary care reforms. First, most
longitudinal studies included in this review were per-
formed with samples of chronically ill adults, while
fewer were conducted in the general adult population
and none were conducted in children. Few studies
accounted for selection of physicians and patients into
emergent reform initiatives by employing analytical
techniques, such as difference-in-differences, propen-
sity scores or instrumental variables. Future research
should aim to evaluate indicators of health utilization,
processes of care and physician productivity for which
a change over time clearly shows improvements for pa-
tients and for the health system. Such indicators might in-
clude hospital readmissions and timely post-discharge
follow-up care for targeted patient subgroups. Further,
early adopters of reforms are generally more receptive to
change [29], and an investigation into the dynamics of
early versus late adopters could help gain insight into the
potential for reforms to improve quality and performance.
Our results have implications for both policymakers and
researchers. Firstly, we find evidence that interventions
Table 7 Quality of evidence assessment
Outcome Reform Number of
studies
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aThe main source of indirectness stems from the evaluation of different team-based interventions. Given the small number of studies, we conducted a pooled
assessment of the evidence from Alberta and Quebec in order to provide an overall assessment of the evidence
bThe main source of indirectness stems from results on a number of different interventions examined in relation to payment models in Ontario that we pooled in
order to provide an overall assessment of the evidence
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succeed in meeting health system objectives when they
are targeted and carefully designed. For instance, although
FMGs in Quebec were introduced with an aim to improve
access to and quality of care for chronically ill patients, it
is unclear whether this can be achieved when the estab-
lishment of chronic disease management programs is
not integral to the reform. Where financial incentives
such as pay-for-performance are concerned, consider-
ation for the overarching physician payment model is
central to designing a reward payment that avoids per-
verse incentives for patient risk selection by physicians.
Secondly, the different nature of the interventions is of
importance to researchers seeking to assess impacts of
primary care reform. Unlike reforms to payment which
can only be implemented in one way (eg. a physician is
either paid via blended capitation or FFS), identifying
effects is more difficult in team-based reforms since
versions of the intervention differ by how each practice
implements the model (eg. the extent to which nurses
are integrated in patient case management). Finally,
policy-makers and researchers should provide clear def-
initions of the roles, activities and processes enacted
under the transformations intended by the reforms to
best inform future efforts to enhance primary care.
Limitations
In this review, we tried to minimize heterogeneity by in-
cluding only population-wide interventions that occurred
after 2000, and by restricting our criteria to studies with a
longitudinal design. Nevertheless, considerable heterogen-
eity in interventions and in methodological approaches
remained, which precluded meta-analysis and sub-group
analysis. Although administrative data is useful for quanti-
fying the change induced by the introduction of reforms,
it is limited in terms of gauging the heterogeneity of re-
form implementation within practices. The effects of new
models may be attenuated if high and low performing
practices are not distinguishable from each other. Qualita-
tive studies from Quebec and Ontario have described vari-
ation in how nurses are integrated into practice according
to whether they hold responsibilities for patient care or
are treated as assistants [30, 31]. Future reviews should
consider the body of qualitative evidence to address nor-
mative questions that take stock of what is taking place
within healthcare organizations versus what should be
taking place.
Conclusion
The quality of evidence ranged from low to high for
each indicator of performance. Given our interest in
isolating the causal effects of reforms we focused on
methodologies that used an appropriate comparison
group that controlled for factors contributing to the se-
lection of physicians and patients into new primary care
models and secular time trends in the outcome. The small
number of studies from Alberta and Quebec suggested
that team-based models contributed to reductions in ED
use. Regarding processes of care, the evidence indicated
that increases in preventive care services could be attrib-
uted to blended capitation models and P4P in Ontario.
Although blended capitation appeared to lead to decreases
in the number of services delivered and patients seen per
day, the number of enrolled patients and number of days
worked in a year was similar to that of enhanced FFS prac-
tices. Based on this review, we recommend methodologies
that generate evidence on reform effects, particularly in
Quebec and Alberta where only a small body of literature
exists.
Appendix A
Search strategy and terms
Keyword search terms:
Family Medicine Group*










Primary Health Care Initiative
Search strategies:
Canad* AND (“family medicine group*”)
Canad* AND (“integrated primary care network*”)
Canad* AND (“family health team*”)
Canad* AND (“family health organization*”)
Canad* AND (“family health group*”)
Canad* AND (“primary care network*”)
Canad* AND (“comprehensive care model*”)
Canad* AND (“enhanced fee for service”)
Canad* AND (“capitation”) AND (“payment”)
Canad* AND (“pay for performance”)
Appendix B
Table 8 Quality rating categories according to GRADE
guidelines for assessing the body of evidence
Quality rating Definition
High Confidence that the true effect is close to the
estimated effect
Moderate True effect is expected to be close to the estimated
effect however it may be significantly different
Low True effect may be very different from the
estimated effect
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CI, confidence Interval; FFS, fee for service; FHG, family health group; FHO,
family health organization; FMG, family medicine group; GRADE, grading of
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performance; PCMH, patient-centered medical home; PCN, primary care
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